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 REGULATION AND THE THEORY OF
 LEGISLATIVE CHOICE: THE INTERSTATE
 COMMERCE ACT OF 1887*
 THOMAS W. GILLIGAN, WILLIAM J. MARSHALL,
 University of Southern California L. F. Rothschild, Inc.
 and
 BARRY R. WEINGAST
 Hoover Institution
 THE economic effects of federal regulation cannot be explained apart
 from congressional institutions. Two factors determine the specific pat-
 tern. The first is how interests are represented in the Congress, especially
 in the relevant committees. Committees matter because their members
 can veto proposals made by others. The second factor is bicameralism.
 The need to build majority support in two chambers matters when interest
 groups are not distributed identically across both houses. Specific inter-
 ests win in the legislative process because of their representation within
 the political institutions.
 We examine the first major regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce
 Commission (ICC), founded in 1887. The inception of the ICC was not
 solely a cartel mechanism for the railroads (as the pure capture view
 asserts) nor solely a mechanism to correct market abuses by the railroads
 (as the public interest theory maintains). The ICC provided an array of
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 California. William J. Marshall is Vice President of L. F. Rothschild, Inc. Barry R. Weingast
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 Stanford University, and the University of Washington. We also thank Elisabeth Case for
 her editorial assistance and Eric Amel and Brian Marks for their research assistance. Barry
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 benefits, some to railroads and some to nonrailroad interests, notably
 shorthaul shippers.
 Our analysis contains three components. First, we develop a theory of
 legislative choice. Second, we study the effect of the instruments pro-
 posed to regulate the railroads. Third, we analyze the incidence of various
 bills and derive testable implications on how congressmen would vote
 among the alternatives. Because proposals had different expected eco-
 nomic effects across geographic regions, we can test hypotheses about
 the expected economic effect of the legislation by studying the voting
 decisions of representatives of these regions.
 Three sources of evidence support our interpretation: the incidence
 analysis of the various bills, our empirical results from the voting analy-
 sis, and evidence of others about the actual effects on railroad prices. We
 conclude that the legislation did not provide railroads with a cartel man-
 ager but was instead a compromise among many contending interests.
 Organized antirailroad groups gained important restrictions on railroad
 pricing in some markets; the railroads benefited by earning supracompeti-
 tive profits in others. The net effect of regulation on railroad profits was
 small but positive. The most important effect of the Interstate Commerce
 Act (ICA) seems to have been a transfer of wealth among customer
 classes, specifically, from longhaul to shorthaul shippers.
 This article proceeds as follows. Section I reviews prior economic mod-
 els of railroading and shows why previous tests of the effect of the ICC
 have not resolved the issue of who benefited from the ICC. Section II
 focuses on the political economy of interest groups and develops the
 multi-interest group perspective necessary to study the problem. Section
 III presents our model of legislative choice and derives its implications for
 regulation. Turning to the political battle over regulation, Sections IV and
 V reveal that the politics parallel the economic distinctions developed in
 Section II. Section VI tests the hypotheses concerning economic effect
 using logit analysis of congressional voting.
 I. A REVIEW OF RAILROAD ECONOMICS
 The railroad network was a complex system of interrelated markets.2
 We distinguish two important categories of markets, the so-called short-
 haul and longhaul markets. Longhaul markets are those served by several
 railroads and were naturally competitive. The railroads attempted to car-
 1 See, for example, Paul MacAvoy, The Economic Effects of Regulation: The Truck Line
 Railroad Cartels and the Interstate Commerce Commission before 1900 (1965).
 2 John R. Meyer et al., The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries
 (1959); and Ann F. Friedlaender, The Dilemma of Freight Transportation Regulation (1969).
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 telize these markets and met with some success.3 Shorthaul markets,
 however, were served by a single railroad. They were naturally monopo-
 listic and were characterized by discriminatory pricing.4
 These two markets are illustrated in Figure 1. This figure also shows
 that shorthauls were often a segment along a particular longhaul route.
 Out of Chicago, there were four major competing roads to the East Coast
 (according to Ulen, 73 percent of all dead freight out of Chicago is bound
 for Europe). Along each of these routes were a series of shorthaul monop-
 oly routes. Reflecting the different market structures, shorthaul prices
 tended to be significantly higher than prices charged for the longhaul of
 which they were part.5
 The pattern of pricing generated two separate sources of political sup-
 port for regulatory intervention. The railroads sought regulation to im-
 prove their unstable private cartels.6 Shorthaul shippers, conversely,
 sought regulation to alleviate discriminatory pricing.7 The literature has
 also provided considerable evidence about the regulatory effects of the
 3 MacAvoy, supra note 1; Robert Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive
 Committee, 1880-86, 14 Bell J. Econ. 301-14 (1983); and Thomas Ulen, Cartels and Regula-
 tion, (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford Univ., December 1979).
 4 There is an extensive literature, mainly by historians, focusing on the effects of discrimi-
 natory pricing and especially on the political reactions by various groups. Important studies
 include Lee Benson, Merchants, Farmers, Railroads (1955), on New York merchants; Solon
 Buck, The Agrarian Crusade (1920), on farmers; Gerald D. Nash, Origins of the Interstate
 Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Pennsylvania History 181-95 (1957), on Pennsylvania oil produc-
 ers; and George Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws (1971), on the commercial centers
 of the older water transportation system. Several economists have analyzed the basis for
 this pricing system, for example, Meyer et al., supra note 2; and Friedlaender, supra note 2.
 5 These price differentials were generally not justifiable solely on the basis of cost differ-
 entials. See the discussion in MacAvoy, supra note 1, ch. 3, esp. at 30-32. Much of the
 debate in Congress was over this issue. See Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of
 Railways (1908).
 6 This aspect of political demand for regulation is studied extensively by Paul MacAvoy,
 supra note 1; Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation: 1877-1918 (1965); George Hilton,
 The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J. Law & Econ. 87-113 (1966); Robert
 Spann & E. W. Erickson, The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Cartelization
 and Regulation, 1 Bell J. Econ. 227-44 (1970); Ulen, supra note 3; and Richard Zerbe, The
 Costs and Benefits of Early Regulation of the Railroads, 11 Bell J. Econ. 343-50 (1980).
 7 This aspect of the demand for regulation is studied extensively by historians and polit-
 ical scientists, as well as by economists. Among the former are Buck, supra note 4; Benson,
 supra note 4; Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955);
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC, 61 Yale L. J. 467-509 (1952); Albro
 Martin, The Troubled Subject of Railroad Regulation in the Gilded Age-a Reappraisal, 54
 J. Am. Hist. 339-71 (1967); Miller, supra note 4; and Nash, supra note 4. Among the latter
 are Friedlaender, supra note 2; and Meyer et al., supra note 2. More generally, see the
 recent summaries of these literatures by Morris P. Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legisla-
 tive Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J. L. Econ., & Org. 33-51; and
 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State (1982).
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 Chicago
 East coast - Europe
 FIGURE 1.-Alternative routes from Chicago to the East Coast
 Interstate Commerce Act and is nearly unanimous on the following:
 shorthaul prices declined while longhaul prices increased. This pattern
 clearly benefited shorthaul shippers and harmed longhaul shippers.8 The
 effects on the railroads, however, are more controversial. Were longhaul
 prices higher because regulation improved the railroads' private cartels9
 or for some other reason? Ulen, for example, notes that the success of the
 private cartels was positively correlated with the business cycle.'l Since
 the ICC began during an upswing, Ulen's analysis predicts an increase in
 longhaul prices even without a government-supported cartel."
 The following comparative statics analysis of regulatory pricing makes
 8 See, for example, MacAvoy, supra note 1; Spann & Erickson, supra note 6; Friedlaen-
 der, supra note 2; and Zerbe, supra note 6.
 9 As argued in MacAvoy, supra note 1; Kolko, supra note 6; and Spann & Erickson,
 supra note 6.
 10 Ulen, supra note 3; and Thomas Ulen, Railroad Cartels before 1887: The Effectiveness
 of Private Enforcement of Collusion (1982). See also the extensive analysis by Porter, supra
 note 3.
 l Furthermore, Zerbe, supra note 6, challenges the results of Spann & Erickson, supra
 note 6, showing that their calculations were incorrect. His recalculations show that the gains
 to nonrailroad interests appear to exceed those to railroads.
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 the issue of the effect of the act on the railroads even more puzzling.12
 One of the chief regulatory mechanisms of the ICA, the shorthaul pricing
 constraint (SHPC), made it unlawful "to charge or receive any greater
 compensation . . . for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same
 line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer
 distance." To meet this constraint, railroads would both lower shorthaul
 prices and increase longhaul prices. Even if the ICC played no direct role
 in facilitating the railroads' ability to coordinate and maintain prices
 above the competitive longhaul price, the SHPC would have increased
 longhaul prices. Moreover, we show elsewhere that the effect of the
 SHPC on railroad profits is indeterminate.'3 The SHPC could have in-
 creased railroad profits without facilitating longhaul railroad cartels.
 Several hypotheses attempt to explain the inception of regulation. The
 first holds that railroad regulation was designed primarily to provide the
 railroads with a cartel mechanism to replace their unstable private ones.
 The second hypothesizes that regulation sought to benefit shorthaul ship-
 pers at the expense of the railroads by eliminating shorthaul price dis-
 crimination. These two hypotheses have received the lion's share of at-
 tention. In what follows, we add a third: that regulation was designed to
 benefit both shorthaul shippers and railroads at the expense of longhaul
 shippers by lowering shorthaul rates and increasing longhaul rates. This
 need not have involved a governmentally managed cartel for the rail-
 roads, as the discussion of the SHPC suggests.
 The evidence provided by MacAvoy and others about the decrease in
 shorthaul prices appears to rule out the first hypothesis, but not the sec-
 ond and third. To discriminate between the latter, we need to show that
 both shorthaulers and railroaders expected to benefit. We do so in three
 ways. First, by studying the legislative process, we show the evolution of
 the regulatory proposals toward a compromise benefiting these two
 groups. Second, the analysis of congressional voting reveals that both
 these groups expected to benefit while longhaulers did not. This reveals
 how the coalition expected to produce mutually beneficial legislation.
 Third, elsewhere we use stock market analysis to show that the expected
 profits for longhaul railroads were positive.'4
 12 The following results are derived in Thomas W. Gilligan, William J. Marshall, & Barry
 R. Weingast, The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: The Political and Economic Conse-
 quences of the Shorthaul Pricing Constraint (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University,
 November 1988).
 13 Id.
 14 Id.
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 II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTEREST-GROUP FORMATION
 The simple cartel-by-design thesis, based on a dichotomy between con-
 centrated producers and diffuse consumers, fails to capture the underly-
 ing economic and political realities of the late nineteenth century railroad
 controversy. The struggle over the ICA was not simply the railroads
 against an undifferentiated set of consumers. The analysis instead re-
 quires a multi-interest-group perspective.15 Benson put this as follows. In
 the process of developing their paramount economic position, the rail-
 roads "had to affect adversely other powerful vested interests. Since
 those interests were unable to protect themselves according to the old
 rules of the economic game, they proposed to rewrite the rules."16
 Consider some of the diverse but geographically concentrated groups
 with an important stake in railroad pricing practices. Merchants across
 the United States depended on the rails for their livelihood. City by
 city, they formed associations to influence their political representatives.
 Many (for example, those shipping from New York to the hinterlands)
 faced only one railroad and therefore monopoly prices.17 Similarly, the
 rise of the railroads dramatically affected commercial interests that domi-
 nated the old river towns along the traditional water transportation routes
 (for example, those in the Mississippi and Ohio River valleys). Lower-
 cost railroads displaced whole local economies as hundreds of local col-
 lection points that depended on water traffic became technologically ob-
 solete.18 Just as today's displaced groups provide political support for a
 host of relief programs, so did these groups. Similarly, dramatic transfor-
 mations in the industrial organization of particular markets followed the
 rise of the railroads.19 While the rise of new industries displaced older
 15 The analytical versions of this theory allow us to account for bias in favor of a compro-
 mise among many different groups in regulatory contexts that involve many interest groups.
 See, for example, Morris P. Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies (1974);
 and Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 211-
 40(1976).
 16 Benson, supra note 4, at 241.
 17 Benson, supra note 4, for example, discusses the rise of a large number of commercial
 associations and lobbying groups (for example, Cheap Freight Railroad League, the Ameri-
 can Cheap Transportation Association, National Anti-monopoly Cheap Railway League,
 Boston Merchants Association, and the Chamber of Commerce of New York City). He also
 describes the coordination of many of these groups with various congressmen. Clearly,
 these groups provided electoral support for nonrailroad positions.
 18 Miller, supra note 4.
 19 For a colorful description of this transformation, see Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible
 Hand (1977).
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 producers, the latter did not simply vanish. Rather, they organized to
 seek relief.20
 Finally, with the coming of the rails, farmers had become specialized
 participants in international markets.21 As producers, they had a direct
 pecuniary stake in railroad pricing. But they were clearly not of one
 voice. Farmers in the Midwest often faced a single railroad and, hence,
 discriminatory pricing, while farmers in the states west of Chicago
 seemed to benefit from competitive longhaul pricing. Since farmers were
 the most diffuse group, theirs is unlikely to have been the most active
 lobby.22 Yet, their clear pecuniary interest implies that representatives of
 districts where farmers were the vast bulk of constituents would have
 shared their constituents' preferences.23
 Thus, a host of nonrailroad interests had a stake in market intervention.
 Both sides were organized. Showing that different groups provided sup-
 port for particular types of market intervention is one thing: showing how
 these sometimes conflicting interests led to legislation providing benefits
 to their coalition is another. How were these interests coordinated (if at
 all), what provisions did they seek, and were they successful?
 III. THE THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS
 The political battle over federal railroad regulation covered more than a
 decade and was played out in Congress.24 Understanding the effects of the
 ICA and its consequences for the economy requires understanding con-
 gressional institutions and their effect on policy choice. A comparison of
 the different proposals from this perspective yields testable implications
 about how specific congressmen could be expected to vote.25
 20 See, for example, Benson's description of the older cattle ranches in upstate New
 York, supra note 4. These were in the process of being driven out of business by newer
 cattle ranches in the West, made economically viable by the coming of the rails.
 21 See the discussion in Allen Bogue, From Prairie to Corn Belt (1963).
 22 As Benson, supra note 4, shows.
 23 In modern times, it is precisely this mechanism that underlies the political support for
 current agricultural programs benefiting this group.
 24 While the President retained a veto over any congressional legislation, he appears not
 to have been an active player in this controversy and thus receives scant attention in the
 literature and in what follows. We conjecture that, since so many different constituencies
 were mobilized on this issue, and that-as we argue below-the compromise appears to
 have required the support of most of these, any widely supported legislative compromise
 would be deemed satisfactory by the President.
 25 One prefatory remark is necessary. While railroad regulation by the ICC during most of
 the post-World War II era included comprehensive political control of the industry (for
 example, pricing, entry, and exit), the battle over the ICA in the 1880s concerned a consider-
 ably different form of regulation. It was not a bill to regulate railroad rates, though it
 41
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 10 Nov 2017 22:06:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
 Congressional institutions are well known to shape legislation. In what
 follows, we make use of two key institutional features: (1) bicameralism: a
 necessary condition for enacting legislation is that each house of Congress
 pass a version of the bill; and (2) committee veto power: if the House and
 Senate pass different versions of the same bill, they must be reconciled
 through a conference procedure. If the two sides fail to agree on identical
 versions, the bill does not become law. The compromise is fashioned by a
 subset of members from the relevant committees in each house. Any
 legislation they produce faces an up-or-down vote (that is, no amend-
 ments are allowed).
 The implications of these institutions are as follows. The first implies
 that, when different interests dominate the different houses, each interest,
 in effect, holds a veto over legislation. Together with the theory of re-
 vealed preference, the second implies that, if a compromise occurs, the
 interests represented at the compromise must expect to be made better off
 under the compromise than under the status quo.26 Because the different
 alternatives have varying incidences, incidence analysis yields predic-
 tions about the voting behavior of individual representatives. In order to
 develop these predictions, however, we need to appropriate theoretical
 tools, and to these we now turn.
 The Theory of Legislative Choice
 In developing techniques to study legislative choice of regulatory in-
 struments, we follow Fiorina and Weingast.27 We begin with the assump-
 contained important provisions affecting prices; nor did it address entry or exit. Rather, the
 political battle was fought over specific practices. As we show below, these had clear
 incidences with predictable effects for different groups. The act provided no powers for the
 ICC to set rates. Reagan, the proponent of the House bill, is quoted as saying, "One of the
 greatest troubles I have had even with the friends of legislation in this direction has been
 to get them to understand that this time [the Reagan bill] is not a bill to regulate freight
 rates. ... I know the difficulties which would attend any measure attempting to prescribe
 rates" (Haney, supra note 5, at 309). When, several years later, the ICC attempted to
 set rates, the Supreme Court held the action beyond its statutory authority (ICC v. Cincin-
 nati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry., 1897). In moder times, we are accustomed to delegating
 considerable discretion to regulatory agencies with no (substantive) holds barred. But this
 was not the case for the ICC. While the ICA contained language similar to that used in
 moder grants of discretion-for example, "All rates shall be just and reasonable"-
 phrases of this type did not attain their current meaning until well into the twentieth century
 with the development of administrative law.
 26 The prohibition of amendments on the vote over the final compromise conveys sig-
 nificant discretion. It allows the conferees to choose, subject to the majority constraint,
 which of the many policies becomes the final bill. The important power of the conference
 procedure is analyzed in Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Foundations of Commit-
 tee Power, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85-104.
 27 Fiorina, supra note 15; and Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms:
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 FIGURE 2.-Policy choice space with legislator preferences
 tion that each legislator's preferences are based on the electoral contest
 he faces; in particular, each is assumed to maximize his electoral support
 based on the mix of interests in his district.28 Each, therefore, has an ideal
 point, that is, a policy alternative that maximizes his electoral support.
 Further, each prefers alternatives closer to his ideal to those farther away.
 We argued in Section II that the railroad controversy was actually two
 separate controversies, one involving shorthaul pricing and one involving
 longhaul pricing. The preferences of different i terests varied over
 policies that affect these two problems. To be more precise about the
 relationship between legislator preferences and policy choice, we con-
 sider a two-dimensional set of policy alternatives. Let the horizontal di-
 mension be the price over shorthauls which may range from the competi-
 tion price, psc, to the monopoly price, Psm; and let the vertical dimension
 be the price over longhauls, which may range from the competition price,
 Plc, to the monopoly or cartel profit-maximizing price, pi . This yields a
 two-dimensional policy space that is a compact subset of R2, as depicted
 in Figure 2.
 Legal Process or Administrative Process? Public Choice (1982). Barry R. Weingast, Regula-
 tion, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency-Clientele Rela-
 tions, 44 Law & Contemp. Prob. 147-48; and Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureau-
 cratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
 Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765-800.
 28 This approach to legislators is standard. Both Fiorina, supra note 15, and Peltzman,
 supra note 15, for example, study policymakers of this type.
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 Also shown in Figure 2 are several ideal points. A legislator repre-
 senting solely a railroad constituency, for example, prefers alternatives in
 the upper right corner, that is, (Psm, Plm). Since the upper contour sets of
 railroad profits are convex over this price space, their profits fall off as we
 move farther away from this point. Presumably, their representatives
 shared these preferences. The ideal of a representative from a district
 dominated by shorthaul shippers is along the vertical axis. We assume
 that shorthaul interests-and, hence, their representatives-care solely
 about shorthaul prices. An indifference curve through any point is a line
 that parallels the vertical axis. We can also depict the preferences of
 longhaul shippers. We assume that they care solely about longhaul prices.
 A longhauler's indifference curve through any point is a line that parallels
 the horizontal axis.
 Finally, we have also depicted the status quo, pO, on the figure. It is at
 the monopoly shorthaul price, Psm, since railroads were free to charge the
 monopoly price in these markets. We place p? somewhat above the com-
 petitive longhaul price. While cartels were not governmentally supported,
 they were not strictly illegal in the preregulation environment; nor were
 they totally ineffective.29
 The implications of this framework are twofold. First, it allows us to
 show how various regulatory instruments would alter the status quo.
 Thus, a policy legalizing pooling, the major mechanism underpinning the
 railroads' cartel, would raise longhaul rates and can therefore be repre-
 sented as a vertical move from pO (see Figure 3). A bill that combines a
 prohibition on pooling with an SHPC would move primarily left and down
 from the status quo.
 Second, this approach allows us to show the divergent strategies of the
 two coalition leaders. Confronting the status quo, pO, each attempted to
 devise a set of legislative provisions that would move prices in a direction
 preferred by his constituents. For the railroads' representatives, this
 meant policies above, or above and to the left of, the status quo. For
 representatives of the shorthaul shippers, this meant policies to the left of
 the status quo. For illustration, we show plausible locations for the legis-
 lative proposals of each coalition: pS represents the bill favoring the rail-
 roads produced in the Senate, while ph represents the bill favoring short-
 haulers produced in the House (see Figure 2). By varying the proposed
 bill, the coalition leaders determined which legislators joined them and
 which opposed them.
 29 Porter, supra note 3.
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 IV. THE REGULATORY PROPOSALS: THE HOUSE VERSUS THE SENATE
 By the mid-1880s, two major coalitions of interest groups had formed.
 Each had its congressional sponsor who devised a proposal to benefit its
 constituency. There is nearly unanimous agreement that railroads domi-
 nated the committee with jurisdiction in the Senate, while shorthaul ship-
 pers dominated the corresponding committee in the House.30 This pattern
 of dominance is assumed throughout, and is therefore a maintained hy-
 pothesis of the analysis.
 The political controversy over the ICA was not simply debate between
 competing ideals; it was a battle over instruments and control mecha-
 nisms. To understand the ultimate incidence of the ICA, we analyze three
 sets of instruments: those preferred by each side, those proposed by each
 side, and those in the final bill.
 The Railroad Bill
 The railroads' ideal legislation provided for a stable cartel upholding
 monopoly prices (as shown in Figure 2), and included the following fea-
 30 Widespread agreement exists on this point. See, for example, Kolko, supra note 6;
 Hilton, supra note 6; and Skowronek, supra note 7, on Cullom vs. Reagan; see also Nash,
 supra note 4, on Reagan.
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 TABLE 1
 CHARACTERISTICS OF REGULATORY PROPOSALS
 PROPOSALS
 MECHANISMS Railroads Senate House Compromise
 Pooling Yes Absent No No
 Published rates Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Antirebate Yes Yes Yes Yes
 SHPC Weak Weak Strong Strong
 Commission Yes Yes No Yes
 tures:3' (1) legalization of pooling-the principal means used by the rail-
 roads to allocate traffic among themselves; (2) published rates; (3) an
 antirebate, antidrawback provision; (4) some weak form of SHPC; and (5)
 a commission malleable to the railroads' interests. These features are
 summarized in the first column of Table 1. The first feature would play a
 role in the extracting of monopoly rents and provide the stability neces-
 sary to maintain them. Pooling facilitated coordination of the firms mak-
 ing up the cartel; legalization combined with enforcement by a commis-
 sion would make these agreements far more effective.32 The remaining
 features were intended to police cheating on the cartel price. The second
 and third, and also the fourth, would play this role by changing the costs
 and benefits from cheating. MacAvoy's discussion of the instruments
 contained in the final legislation pertains here as well:
 Regulation under [these provisions] reduced the profits from cheating on official
 rates. Under circumstances in which disloyalty did not violate the law, cheating
 resulted in smaller profits for a shorter period of time under regulation for two
 reasons. First, any rate cut that was "just and reasonable" had to be extended to
 all traffic-so that increased profits from cutting rates on grain to NY had to be
 accompanied by lower profits from required cutting of local rates. Second, the
 discount had to be announced and announcement-if followed by reduction of the
 31 These items are nearly identical to those proposed by Albert Fink for the railroads to
 stabilize their cartels. See Gilchrist's analysis of Fink's proposal to provide the legal under-
 pinnings for cartels, D. T. Gilchrist, Albert Fink and the Pooling System, 34 Bus. Hist. Rev.
 25-49 (1960). Fink was instrumental to the operation of the railroad cartels prior to the ICA.
 According to Gilchrist, Fink "occupied a position of prominence analogous to that enjoyed
 by Morgan."
 32 As Ulen, supra note 3 and supra note 10, shows, pooling was the primary mechanism
 used to maintain the railroads' private cartels. Legalizing pooling would have greatly im-
 proved its effectiveness. See also MacAvoy, supra note 1, ch. 4, at 91-95; and Gilchrist,
 supra note 31.
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 official rate-reduced the length of time in which the disloyal firm received larger
 profits.33
 These features also changed the incentives to police cheating by other
 railroads and by other customers not receiving the discount. Reporting
 the information to the commission would lead to legal sanctions, whereas
 prior to any legislation, the only available response was retaliation. Under
 provision 2, tariffs had to be filed with the commission, so charging any-
 thing but the published rates was sufficient evidence of violation of the
 act. The purpose of provisions 3 and 4 was to allow railroads to continue
 discriminating (charging monopoly prices on the shorthaul), but also to
 prevent cheating on the longhaul cartel by individual railroads who sought
 to give specific price discounts. Additionally, the third would mitigate the
 monopsony power of certain shippers (such as Standard Oil). The fifth
 provision would blunt the influence of other interest groups on regulation
 and would allow a commission the flexibility to enforce a stable cartel
 agreement and to adjudicate disputes among railroads.34
 This type of commission would clearly serve railroad interests. From
 the strong opposition of the antirailroad coalition and the large number of
 citations of railroad influence over the state commissions, this bias seems
 likely. This inference is also supported by Hilton's report that "writers
 who favored establishment of a commission in this controversy were
 uniformly in favor of legalization of pooling"; that is, those favoring
 cartelization also favored a commission.35
 The bill put forth by Senator Cullom of Illinois became the major legis-
 lative vehicle in the Senate and included some but not all of the above
 provisions (see Table 1). Its major features were as follows. First, and
 most significantly, the bill did not legalize pooling. In this important
 sense, the bill failed to include the major cartel mechanism and was there-
 fore less than the railroads' ideal. The antirebate provision and the pub-
 lished rate provision were included, as was a "weak" and "elastic"
 SHPC. Finally, the Cullom bill called for enforcement by a commission.
 A commission was valuable to senators because the Senate confirms ap-
 33 MacAvoy, supra note 1, at 124.
 34 To quote Hilton on the advantages to the railroads from provision 4, appropriately
 interpreted by a friendly commission: "[The railroads] wanted a prohibition of charging
 more for a shorthaul than for a longer haul which the Commission might waive so that they
 might continue the chronic, discriminatory form of long- and shorthaul ratemaking [that is,
 local monopoly pricing], but avoid the competitive, rate-cutting version of the same prac-
 tice. For this and for the more general necessity of providing day-to-day stability of the
 cartels, railroad men characteristically felt that a commission vested with a high degree of
 discretion in its power was necessary." Hilton, supra note 6, at 105.
 35 Hilton, supra note 6, at 105.
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 pointees to the commission and therefore could bias appointees in the
 railroads' favor.36
 The Antirailroad Bill
 The antirailroad coalition consisted of more diverse interests than did
 the railroads. Judge Reagan, a representative from Texas, played the
 major role in forming the coalition by combining a series of related provi-
 sions and pushing them through the House. The logic underlying Rea-
 gan's bill is as follows. First, because the unifying factor underpinning
 this coalition was that nearly all were victims of some form of local
 monopoly pricing, all favored elimination of this form of pricing discrimi-
 nation. Reagan's bill therefore included a strong SHPC (see Table 1).
 Second, they were against cartelization and allowing railroads undisputed
 and unregulated control over prices. This coalition sought to prohibit
 pooling because the fall in shorthaul rates under the SHPC depended on
 the longhaul rate. Pooling implied higher longhaul rates and hence
 weakened the effect of the SHPC. Third, they favored published rates to
 ease enforcement of violations. Fourth, a Senate-appointed, railroad-
 dominated commission was unsatisfactory. Since railroads were sure to
 be the more active, aggressive participants in any regulatory process, a
 commission was likely to bend the interpretation of the act in their
 favor.37 Hence, a provision for direct enforcement by the courts was
 preferred. As Fiorina points out, this was the enforcement strategy
 adopted three years later in the Sherman Antitrust Act.38 Additionally,
 part of the coalition was primarily against rebates, drawbacks, and other
 provisions that gave price breaks to specific shippers.39
 The diversity of the antirailroad coalition forces us to address a further
 issue. Because the railroads were sure to be a constant and potentially
 overwhelming opponent in the postlegislative environment, could the dif-
 fuse and varied interests in the Reagan coalition rationally expect to reap
 benefits once the act passed?
 The answer is revealed by the form of the regulatory instruments. The
 bill did not delegate broad, discretionary powers to a commission, as is
 common for modern regulatory agencies. Members of the antirailroad
 36 See Fiorina, supra note 27; and Fiorina, supra note 7.
 37 There is nearly unanimous agreement on this point. See Haney, supra note 5; Hilton,
 supra note 6; and Fiorina, supra note 7.
 38 Fiorina, supra note 27.
 39 To quote Hilton, supra note 6, "the Reagan bill was formulated by ... an attorney for
 the Petroleum Producers' Union, a group of shippers in the Pennsylvania oil fields who
 suffered a chronic, discriminatory form of long- and shorthaul ratemaking. They were also
 heavily motivated by hostility." See Nash, supra note 4, for an extensive analysis of this
 thesis.
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 coalition rationally feared railroad domination of a commission. Reagan
 attempted to minimize interpretive bias in favor of railroads by creating
 provisions with easy tests that could be applied by the courts: was a
 shipper charged anything but the published rates? Did the published rates
 violate a specific provision of the act (for example, was the rate from New
 York City to Vermont higher than the rate from New York to Chicago
 along the same line)? Did a specific shipper get a price break not offered
 to other shippers of the same class? The proposed provisions placed
 specific, enforceable limits on railroads' pricing behavior with clear inci-
 dences in favor of Reagan's coalition.40 Put simply, the prohibitions were
 designed to limit the railroads' influence in the postlegislative era.
 Comparing the Two Bills
 The major differences between the Cullom and Reagan bills can be
 summarized as follows (see Table 1): (1) the Cullom bill, while not legaliz-
 ing pooling, did not prohibit it; the Reagan bill contained an unambiguous
 prohibition; (2) the antirebate and discrimination clauses differed; (3) the
 Reagan bill contained a stricter SHPC; (4) the Reagan bill called for en-
 forcement through the courts, while the Cullom bill called for enforce-
 ment by a commission.
 The railroads' first preference was for legalizing pooling; their second
 was surely to leave it in legal limbo. The antirailroad coalition, con-
 versely, clearly sought to prohibit pooling; hence its exclusion in the
 Reagan bill. Regarding the SHPC, the railroads' interest was twofold:
 first, to maintain their monopoly power between points that lacked com-
 petition, and, second, to prevent cartel cheating on routes served by
 competing railroads. Hence, the clause in the Cullom bill was more am-
 biguous, and, in part, relied (as Hilton has noted) on judicious enforce-
 ment by a sympathetic commission. The members of Reagan's coalition,
 however, were unanimously against local monopoly pricing and sought
 a strict clause to eliminate it. The SHPC was undoubtedly a necessary
 condition for this coalition to support any legislation or compromise.
 Without it, Reagan's coalition would undoubtedly have blocked any com-
 promise.41
 40 Furthermore, the ICA did not require a small number of bureaucrats to contend with an
 army of railroad representatives over an in-depth analysis of costs, revenue flows, or profits
 that attend modem rate-of-return regulation. Railroads were sure to have overwhelmed the
 small commission in this type of process. Haney, supra note 5, at 308, notes that, during the
 debates, "it was urged that so small a number of men could not possibly supervise so great a
 railway system."
 41 One additional difference between the bills is instructive and provides further evidence
 of the makeup of Reagan's coalition. The Cullom bill specified that shorthaul rates could not
 be higher than longhaul rates when one of the termini of the shorter route coincided with a
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 V. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPROMISE BILL
 The sequence of regulatory proposals played out over a decade. Bills
 passed the House in 1874, 1878, and in the lame duck session following
 the 1884 elections. The first passage of a bill by the Senate occurred in
 early 1885, also in the lame duck session. However, the two sides failed to
 reach a compromise, so the bill died. Deadlock again occurred in 1886:
 the Senate passed its version (May), and the House its version (July),
 with no compromise forthcoming.
 This pattern of radically different bills unaccompanied by compromise
 forces us to ask whether a compromise was feasible.42 Reagan repre-
 sented shorthaul shippers and Cullom, the railroads; committee veto
 power implies that each interest must be made better off by the compro-
 mise. It is not obvious that there existed policies preferred by both sides
 to the status quo, especially because the interests of the shorthaulers
 seemed antithetical to those of the railroads. Historians, for example,
 have provided considerable evidence of the overt hostility of this group to
 the railroads.43 Significantly, the theory developed above provides an
 answer.
 Turning to Figure 4, we show diagrammatically that the feasible region
 of compromise is nonempty. The figure depicts the set of policies pre-
 ferred to the status quo by each coalition. The set of policies preferred by
 Reagan to pO, is H(p?), and the set preferred by Cullom, S(p?). Reagan
 was concerned with shorthaul prices and would clearly be willing to trade
 off increases in longhaul prices for decreases in shorthaul prices. From
 the status quo, the railroad's isoprofit lines imply that they would trade
 terminus of the longer route. The Reagan bill imposed the same restriction, but on a broader
 class of routes: it covered all shorter shipments contained within the longer route. Since
 eastbound traffic out of Chicago and westbound traffic out of New York comprised the lion's
 share of traffic, the difference was clearly aimed at the smallest of all shippers, for example,
 those shipping from a small town in Indiana to a small town in Ohio. It is no surprise the
 railroads were unconcerned about this group. Reagan apparently sought to include these
 diffuse, though politically active, interests in his coalition. As MacAvoy concludes, the
 "reductions in short-distance rates . . . provided the smallest of the shippers, seeing the
 most limited service, with somewhat lower cost of transport." See MacAvoy, supra note 1,
 at 201.
 42 To address this issue, we return to our model of legislative choice. The institutional
 underpinning of the compromise was the conference proceeding in which a small "delega-
 tion" from each chamber met together to forge an agreement. In practice, this meant that
 Judge Reagan and two of his supporters from the House met with Senator Cullom and two of
 his supporters from the Senate. Bringing a compromise bill back to the floor of each house
 required a majority of each delegation to approve the bill. This conveys to each coalition
 leader the veto power noted above. The absence of any compromise suggests that none of
 the alternatives preferred to p? by Reagan and his coalition was preferred by Collum and his
 supporters.
 43 See Buck, supra note 4; or Benson, supra note 4.
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 Longhaul /
 Price
 p0
 Shorthaul
 Price
 Key
 j[l = S(p0) = Set of policies preferred by Cullom (and the RRs) to p0
 m = H (p?) = Set of policies preferred by Reagan (and SH shippers) to p0
 [ = S(p0) n H (p) = Region of mutual gain (i.e., of feasible compromise)
 FIGURE 4.-Set of feasible compromises between railroad and shorthaul shipping inter-
 ests.
 decreases in prices (and profits) from shorthauls for increases in prices
 (and profits) from longhauls. This implies a nonempty region of mutually
 preferred alternatives, H(p?) n S(p?), representing the set of feasible
 bargains between two interests (see Figure 4).
 The model has several implications. First, in comparison with their
 original bills, each interest gained less under the compromise. Second, the
 compromise contained provisions benefiting each so that the package as a
 whole made each better off than under the status quo. Were this not the
 case, their representatives would instead veto it.44
 44 One further event appears to have determined the timing of the compromise. During
 the 1886 period of deadlock, with no compromise in sight, the Supreme Court entered the
 battle. It announced Wabash v. Illinois, a surprise decision striking down state regulation of
 the railroads attempting to control the rates of commodities hauled in interstate commerce.
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 Provisions of the ICA
 An analysis of the provisions included in the compromise confirms the
 prediction made immediately above, namely, that it cannot be considered
 a complete victory for either side. The Senate agreed to prohibit pooling,
 and to accept the House's version of the strict SHPC. The House agreed
 to enforcement by a commission. The implications are as follows. (1) On
 the one hand, it is hard to read this bill as a cartelization package for the
 railroads. They lost on pooling (failing to get even their second prefer-
 ence) and on the SHPC clause. The latter was not given the flexibility
 needed to police cartel cheating while maintaining an individual railroad's
 ability to charge monopoly prices in regions where they were the sole
 railroad.45 (2) On the other hand, it was surely not an onerous set of
 controls. The railroads obtained one of the measures designed to maintain
 prices-the antirebate antiprice-discrimination clause, and this clause
 also mitigated the monopsonistic power of certain shippers. Moreover, by
 raising longhaul rates, strict enforcement of the SHPC may have en-
 hanced railroad profits. (3) The antirailroad coalition got its major pricing
 restriction, the SHPC. This clause clearly provided Reagan's coalition
 with expectation of benefit, and, according to MacAvoy, the expectation
 was borne out: '[Local] shippers benefited from the prohibitions against
 discrimination. Reductions in short-distance rates . . . were not dictated
 The case involved state SHPC clauses, and the decision was delivered on October 25, just
 before the congressional elections. This decision clearly changed the status quo by altering
 the restrictions on railroads in states with commissions dominated by antirailroad groups
 and removing compliant enforcers in states with commissions dominated by railroads. After
 the decade-long legislative deadlock, an acceptable compromise was fashioned within six
 weeks following Wabash. To quote Fiorina, supra note 7, at 3, on the surprise, "During the
 recess [for the 1886 congressional elections] the Supreme Court dropped a bombshell with
 its Wabash decision." "Furthermore, given the earlier debates and events there is good
 reason to believe that absent the Wabash stimulus, the House and Senate would have
 remained at loggerheads, continuing the decade-long debate into future congresses." Id. at
 4. This judgment is supported by contemporary observers. The New York Times, for ex-
 ample, reports the following. Two days following Wabash (October 27, 1886), an article
 urged national legislation stating that Wabash was the strongest kind of argument in favor of
 long-delayed national legislation. By December 10, the Times reported that there was little
 doubt that the bill would become law, and (two days later) that Wabash was believed to have
 pushed forward the legislation. The surprise view is widely held; see Hilton, supra note 6;
 Haney, supra note 5; Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions
 (1941); and Bernard Schwartz, The Economic Regulation of Business and Industry (1973).
 45 On the compromise, Hilton notes that, from the perspective of those attempting to
 foster cartelization, this clause was "worse than 'vague.' . . . Since it did not state forth-
 rightly that its purpose was to prohibit competitive and preserve discriminatory longhaul
 ratemaking, there was no assurance that the courts would interpret the act in such fash-
 ion. ... In fact, the Supreme Court interpreted it in absolutely the reverse fashion." Hilton,
 supra note 6, at 106.
 52
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 10 Nov 2017 22:06:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
 by market conditions but rather followed from the imposition of regula-
 tory rules."46 (4) Longhaul shippers seem to have lost: "Through ship-
 pers were deprived of any observable benefits. When rates were main-
 tained, the grain spreader's costs were increased and Chicago-New York
 grain price differences were greater. During seven years of strong regula-
 tion, the price difference averaged 6 cents per 100 pounds more than in
 the succeeding six years."47 (5) The compromise, the product of two
 groups with diverse interests, necessarily contained some elements pre-
 ferred by one side along with elements preferred by the other and omitted
 important provisions sought by each. It would thus surely pursue carteli-
 zation inconsistently and incompletely. This explains in part the "incon-
 sistencies" studied by Hilton.48 Moreover, Hilton's discussion of how
 legislation after 1900 transformed the ICC into a more explicit cartel
 manager provides further evidence that the original ICA was not designed
 solely for this purpose. (6) Hence, the major effect of participation of the
 railroads seems to have been to protect their interests-that is, to make
 sure they do not lose too much and possibly gain a little-rather than to
 obtain a complete, government-managed cartel. (7) In this sense, the bill
 can be interpreted as a redistribution of wealth among customer classes-
 specifically, from longhaul shippers to shorthaul shippers.49 The clear
 inference is that several nonrailroad interests expected to gain from the
 ICA.
 VI. LOGIT ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING
 Our analysis suggests major differences between the congressmen who
 supported the Cullom bill and those who supported the Reagan bill. Rep-
 resentatives of longhaul shippers should favor the Cullom bill over the
 Reagan bill. Hence, the West (defined as those congressional districts
 whose main roads feed into Chicago) should vote for Cullom; similarly,
 those districts containing major cities with two or more railroads to the
 East Coast are more likely to vote for Cullom than for Reagan. Second,
 shorthaul shippers should favor the Reagan bill. Districts in which most
 inhabitants faced only one railroad to the East Coast should be observed
 to vote disproportionately for Reagan over Cullom. Third, districts with
 46 MacAvoy, supra note 1, at 201.
 47 Id.
 48 Hilton, supra note 6.
 49 Since a large portion of the longhaul traffic was bound for Europe, a noneligible portion
 of this transfer may have been borne by European consumers. The net welfare effects of this
 transfer for the United States may therefore have been positive. Whether any transfer
 occurred, however, depended on the elasticity of the European price with respect to the
 price of American imports.
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 large concentrations of railroad interests should be disproportionately
 disposed toward Cullom over Reagan.
 This section presents results from the analysis of two votes in the
 House: the Reagan bill versus the Cullom bill in July 1886, and the vote on
 the final passage of ICA in January 1887. They allow us to investigate the
 voting decisions of congressmen over the regulatory proposals studied in
 Sections IV and V.
 Data
 The dependent variables in our analysis are the votes noted above.
 Votes are taken from the Congressional Record.5? On the first vote, a vote
 for Reagan is coded as a one, a vote for Cullom as a zero. On the second,
 a vote for the ICA is coded as a one, a vote against, as a zero.
 The explanatory variables are intended to represent the concentrations
 of railroad, longhaul shippers, shorthaul shippers, and farming interests in
 each district. The hypotheses derived above yield predictions about signs
 and significance of coefficients.
 1. Railroad variables. The Statistical Abstract provides data by state
 on (a) the value at cost of railroad property, plant, and equipment and (b)
 annual revenues.51 The components of (a) are combined to produce the
 variable CAPITAL. The variable ROI is computed as revenues per dollar
 of capital investment and is calculated on a per state basis.
 Railroads were clearly one of the major participants in the political
 battle. The more important the railroad's operation to the local economy
 (for example, employment, traffic flows, and as a source of local tax
 revenue), the greater the influence the railroad should exert on the dis-
 trict's representative. CAPITAL attempts to measure this. CAPITAL has
 a mean value of .34 and a standard deviation of .28 billion dollars. More-
 over, holding constant for CAPITAL, the greater the railroad's stake in a
 particular area, the greater the influence it is likely to exert. ROI is a
 proxy for this. ROI has a mean value of 11.07 and a standard deviation of
 5.08 percent.
 50 We have chosen to ignore abstentions but have included the positions of "paired"
 congressmen, that is, those announcing a position but not voting. These congressmen are
 coded as if they had voted. Since they are a small fraction of the votes, this does not affect
 the results. We might have treated an abstention as a position (for example, coded it as a
 middle category in an ordered probit analysis) except for the following objection. This is not
 a homogeneous category, but includes both those choosing not to vote and those who were
 absent but would have voted were they present.
 51 We use gross revenues rather than net income so that income available for distribution
 to all claimants, rather than only equity, is measured. Thus the effects of what may be
 arbitrary variations in capital structure are eliminated.
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 2. Farmers. Fogel provided estimates by state of the value of farm-
 land. His estimates are based on the 1890 census of agriculture.52 We use
 his figures to produce the variable LAND. The more important farmers
 are in a district, the greater the influence on their representatives. LAND
 has a mean value of .35 and a standard deviation of .27 billion dollars.
 Since the data in paragraphs 1 and 2 above are reported by state, the
 districts within a state are assigned identical values of the variables.
 3. Other variables. The remainder of the data consists of dummy
 variables identifying differences among the districts that are not readily
 quantified. CENTER takes on the value one for districts that contained
 major shipping centers or were served by more than one major carrier.53
 Shippers and merchants in centers face the choice of at least two railroads
 for transport and are less likely to be victims of railroad monopoly price
 discrimination. They are therefore less favorable than other districts to
 the strong SHPC in the Reagan bill. Approximately 17 percent of all
 districts are classified as CENTER.
 A value of one for the variable WEST indicates a district north and west
 of Chicago. The least-cost route of grain to the East from these districts
 passed through Chicago over the lines of the Chicago pool members.
 While shippers in these areas suffered from shorthaul discrimination, the
 SHPC was significantly less beneficial to them than to the areas east of
 Chicago. The latter had the longhaul rates out of Chicago constraining
 their shorthaul prices, while the former, because of the relative absence of
 longhauls, would not be benefited by the SHPC. Moreover, they would be
 worse off to the extent that their own rates rose because the SHPC in-
 creased longhaul rates from Chicago to the East Coast. Therefore, these
 areas should be less likely to support the Reagan bill, ceteris paribus.
 Approximately 9 percent of all districts are classified as WEST.
 We also utilize the variable PARTY, which takes on the value of one for
 Democrats. Democrats appear to have been more favorably disposed
 toward shorthaul shippers; indeed, Reagan was a Democrat, while Cul-
 lom was a Republican. To the extent that parties constrained the behavior
 of their members, this variable measures its effect. Approximately 56
 percent of all congressmen voting in Cullom vs. Reagan were Democrats.
 Our specific predictions from Section IV are as follows. Higher levels
 of CAPITAL imply a lower probability of voting for the Reagan bill; the
 52 To value "pure" farmland, he adjusts for the value of buildings, fences, and improve-
 ments. See Robert Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth (1964).
 53 These districts include the major grain shipping centers listed in the Statistical Ab-
 stract, cities with pools overseen by the Joint Economic Committee (the major railroad
 cartel pooling traffic to the East Coast), the major port cities on the Gulf and the Atlantic,
 and cities that were evident as hubs on railroad maps.
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 same holds for ROI. LAND should have the opposite effect on voting:
 higher levels should increase the probability of voting for Reagan. For the
 dummy variables, both WEST and CENTER should lower the probability
 of voting for the Reagan bill.
 For the final vote on the ICA, we make the following predictions. Farm
 representatives (excluding those in the WEST) should vote favorably;
 representatives of longhaul shippers-shown to be potential losers in
 Sections IV and V-should be more likely to vote against. We should
 observe railroads to favor the compromise: veto power held by the rail-
 roads' representatives in the Senate suggests that any proposal making
 them worse off would be vetoed rather than passed.
 Results and Interpretations
 The results for the first vote are reported in Table 2 and are remarkably
 consistent with the perspective presented above. The sign of nearly every
 coefficient is as predicted and they are statistically different from zero.
 Looking across all four models, we find the results robust with respect to
 specification. Both railroad variables are highly significant; an increase in
 either lowers the probability of voting for the Reagan bill. The variable
 TABLE 2
 LOGIT ESTIMATION OF HOUSE VOTES
 REAGAN VS. CULLOM COMPROMISE VS. STATUS QUO
 VARIABLES A B A B
 PARTY 4.42** ... .62 ...
 (.62) (.38)
 CENTER -2.11** -.36 - .57 -.45
 (.68) (.45) (.45) (.44)
 WEST -1.83* -3.60** -2.12** -2.47**
 (.82) (.70) (.65) (.62)
 CAPITAL -5.48** -6.07** - 2.45* -2.47*
 (1.17) (.91) (1.02) (1.01)
 ROI -.22** .23** -.11* -.13**
 (0.05) (.04) (.04) (.04)
 LAND 4.87** 4.82** 3.58** 3.80**
 (1.27) (.72) (1.12) (1.12)
 Log-likelihood -66.18 - 113.80 - 112.10 - 113.512
 % Correctly predicted 88.7 81.2 82.0 81.3
 NOTE.-Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses; 239 observations.
 * Significant at the .05 level.
 ** Significant at the .01 level.
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 representing farming interest, LAND, positively affects the probability.
 Finally, both CENTER and WEST are negative, as expected. The results
 also show that while party appears to have an important effect on voting,
 it does not affect the sign and significance pattern of the other variables,
 with the exception of CENTER, which is significant only in the presence
 of PARTY. In all four specifications, the percentage of votes correctly
 predicted far exceeds the null model's 56 percent.
 To derive the actual effect of the variables on the probability of voting
 for the Reagan bill, we report some additional calculations in Table 3
 based on specification B from Table 2. This reports the change in proba-
 bility of voting for the Reagan bill implied by the estimated coefficients;
 these are calculated by holding all other variables constant at their means.
 A congressman representing a district characterized as a CENTER has a
 .06 lower probability of voting for Reagan; a congressman representing a
 district from the WEST has a .33 lower probability of voting for Reagan.
 We calculate the partial derivative of the probability for the continuous
 variables. In comparison with a district at the mean of the independent
 variables, these calculations imply the following: (1) a district with $100
 million more railroad capital has a .21 lower probability of voting for
 Reagan; (2) a district with a $100 million higher value of land has a .17
 higher probability of voting for Reagan; and a district with a one percent
 higher return on railroad capital has a .03 lower probability of voting for
 Reagan.
 Another way to evaluate these estimates is to calculate their implica-
 tions for specific districts. The probability of voting for the Reagan bill at
 the mean of the independent variables is .56. For a grain-producing dis-
 trict in southern Minnesota, the probability is .06; western farmers facing
 low through rates strongly opposed Reagan. But for a farm district in rural
 TABLE 3
 CHANGES IN PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR REAGAN
 Variable AP 8p/8lx
 CENTER - .06 .
 WEST -.33
 CAPITALa ... -.21
 ROIb ... - .03
 LANDa ... .17
 NOTE.-Changes in probability are calculated at the mean of the indepen-
 dent variable and are based on specification B from Table 2.
 a Per $100 million.
 b Per percentage of return.
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 Indiana containing no centers, the probability is .84. This figure is typical
 of districts in rural Indiana, Ohio, and southern Illinois and shows that the
 major farm areas in these states heavily favored Reagan over Cullom. For
 most of the South, containing few centers, and with greater value of
 farmland than of railroad capital, the probability is high, above .8, and
 often above .9. Finally, for eastern centers with large concentrations of
 railroad property and many railroads, the probability is typically low: for
 Philadelphia, it is .13.
 These results support the perspective developed in Section IV. While
 railroads appear to have had considerable influence over the legislation,
 so, too, did other participants. The biggest group that appears to have
 suffered from local monopoly pricing was farmers. Our estimates imply
 that their representatives reflected this interest. Western farmers, bene-
 fiting from low through rates, were slightly less disposed to favor the
 Reagan bill. Similarly, commercial CENTERs with significant concentra-
 tions of longhaul shippers were less disposed to favor the Reagan bill over
 the Cullom bill.
 The results from the vote on the final compromise (Table 2) provide
 further support for our hypotheses. First, the effects of CENTER and
 WEST are both negative. At the mean of all independent variables,
 WEST lowers the probability of voting for the compromise by .27 (from
 .83 to .56). The railroad variables are negative while the farm variable is
 positive, suggesting that farm interests were more likely to support the
 compromise than were railroads. This does not mean, however, that rail-
 roads voted against the compromise-only that they were, on average,
 less favorable than were farm districts.54 To see this, we calculate the
 effect of a large change in railroad and farm variables on the probability of
 voting for the compromise. As reported in Table 4, adding $300 million in
 railroad capital lowers the probability of voting for the compromise by
 only .26 (from .83 to .57). For farmland, this change increases the proba-
 bility of a favorable vote by .17 (from .83 to -1). By way of comparison,
 the same $300 million change for the vote on the Reagan versus Cullom
 bills lowered railroad support by greater than .56 (from .56 to -0), while it
 increased farm support by greater than .44 (from .56 to --1). These calcu-
 lations cast further doubt on the hypothesis that the ICC was primarily a
 cartel manager for the railroads; farm interests were more favorable than
 railroads and clearly anticipated benefits.
 54 The results-that railroads were not as favorably disposed, on average, to the compro-
 mise as farmers-may simply indicate that the legislation also had clear distributional effects
 across various railroads. Those expecting somewhat lower benefits would have been some-
 what less favorable.
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 TABLE 4
 EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON THE ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF VOTING
 Reagan ICA
 vs. vs.
 Calculation Cullom Status Quo
 Probability of voting favorably at the mean of the
 independent variable .56 .83
 Probability of voting favorably given a $300 million
 increase in CAPITAL -.00 .57
 Probability of voting favorably given WEST equals one -.00 .56
 Probability of voting favorably given a $300 million
 increase in LAND - 1.0 -1.0
 NOTE.-Calculations are based on specification B, Table 2, in both cases.
 VII. CONCLUSIONS
 The primary purpose of this article was to evaluate the anticipated
 incidence of regulatory legislation by examining the political controversy
 surrounding its passage. We developed a model of legislative choice and
 used it to derive implications regarding the characteristics of the final
 legislation and the voting behavior of individual representatives. Our per-
 spective shows that political institutions play a key role in enfranchising
 certain groups and endowing others with veto power.
 We applied this perspective to the problem of the inception of railroad
 regulation in 1887. The railroads created two separate, though not com-
 pletely antithetical, bases of support for regulation: cartel instability on
 the longhaul and local price discrimination on the shorthaul. Hence two
 different, opposing coalitions formed, each seeking political gain by re-
 writing the rules of the economic game.
 Several conclusions emerge from the analysis. Far from having a uni-
 tary effect, the ICA was a compromise among many contending interests.
 Shorthaul shippers gained important restrictions on railroad pricing, im-
 proving their welfare.55 River towns and eastern production centers
 benefited from lessened competition owing to higher longhaul prices.56
 The net effect of the ICA on railroads was small but positive.57 The ICA
 did not spawn a formal railroad cartel but did help railroads maintain
 55 MacAvoy, supra note 1; and Zerbe, supra note 6.
 56 See, for example, Miller, supra note 4; and Benson, supra note 4.
 57 Gilligan, Marshall & Weingast, supra note 12.
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 supracompetitive prices in longhaul markets by explicitly relating short-
 haul and longhaul prices.
 Looking beyond the railroad controversy, the analysis has implications
 for the development and testing of positive theories of regulation. First, a
 multiple-interest-group perspective is frequently necessary to understand
 the inception of regulation. Regulation, in many cases, appears not to
 follow the stylized pattern of a concentrated producer group against an
 undifferentiated, diffuse set of consumers.
 Second, the political system is more than a black box that produces
 legislation by balancing the relevant political interests. Rather, the form
 of regulatory statutes depends critically on the institutions of the legisla-
 tive choice process. Recognizing the key features of this process can
 enhance the predictive power of regulatory theory. We exploited knowl-
 edge about legislative institutions by investigating those interests rep-
 resented at specific veto points in the legislative process, notably the
 relevant committee in each house of Congress. Interests whose represent-
 atives hold veto power can block any legislation that would make them
 worse off. In the case of the ICA, this led to the hypothesis that both
 shorthaul shippers and railroads expected to benefit from legislation. This
 hypothesis is also consistent with our incidence analysis of the bills pro-
 duced by each committee. Previous work focused on coalition formation
 in passage of regulatory legislation.58 Application of this approach when
 there are two groups is far more straightforward than when there are more
 groups. For the former, it is often easy to judge which group is more
 concentrated and hence influential (for example, firms vs. consumers);
 hence, predictions about policy benefits are straightforward. But when
 many active groups are involved, the theory is difficult to apply because it
 provides no means to judge the relative influence of each group ex ante.
 Our analysis takes this a step further by providing a source of information
 about which interests will be successful, namely, those that are advan-
 taged as a result of their representation within the legislature.
 Finally, the methodology used in this article indicates that a variety of
 political data-the pattern of group representation within the political
 institutions, the voting behavior of legislators, using incidence analysis to
 compare proposed legislation with the final legislation-can be employed
 to test theories of regulation. Hypotheses about the economic effect of
 regulation can thus be tested using data from the political controversy
 over that regulation. Because the relevant economic interests are often
 geographically concentrated, hypotheses about the anticipated incidence
 58 For example, Peltzman, supra note 15; and B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regula-
 tion: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected? (1985).
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 of various bills can be tested by observing the behavior of congressmen
 from the relevant locations. These conclusions are also supported by the
 recent work on several aspects of environmental regulation.59 Institu-
 tional analysis of the political process, combined with an economic analy-
 sis of the instruments included in the legislation, appears to be a powerful
 tool for understanding why regulation occurs, as well as for assessing its
 expected economic effect.
 59 Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981); E. Donald
 Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, & John C. Millian, Towards a Theory of Statutory Evolution, 1
 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 313-40; Robert W. Crandall, Air Pollution, Environmentalists and the
 Coal Lobby, in Political Economy of Deregulation (Roger G. Noll & Bruce Owen eds. 1983);
 and Pashigian, supra note 58.
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